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Abstract
This paper examines the interaction between operational and financial hedging in the context of
an internationally competitive but domestically monopolistic firm under exchange rate uncertainty.
Operational hedging is modeled by letting the firm make its export decision after it has observed
the true realization of the then prevailing spot exchange rate. Financial hedging, on the other hand,
is modeled by allowing the firm to trade fairly priced exotic derivatives that are tailor-made for the
firm’s hedging need. We show that both operational and financial hedging unambiguously entice the
firm into producing more. We further derive sufficient conditions under which operational hedging
dominates (is dominated by) financial hedging in terms of promoting the firm’s optimal output.
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1. Introduction
Real options are pervasive in corporate decisions (see Copeland & Antikarov, 2001).
Examples include options to abandon, options to defer, options to expand, options to con-
tract, and many others. In a survey conducted by Triantis and Borison (2001), managers
regard real options as an analytical tool, as a language and framing device for investment
problems, and as an organizational process.
The purpose of this paper is to study the interaction between operational hedging via
real options and financial hedging via customized exotic derivatives.1 To this end, we employ
the model of an exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty a` la Eldor and Zilcha (1987)
∗Tel.: +852-2859-1044; fax: +852-2548-1152.
E-mail address: kpwong@econ.hku.hk.
1Wong (2005) examines the effect of abandonment options and exotic hedging on a firm’s operating
leverage decision.
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(see also Wong, 2002, 2003).2 The firm is a monopoly in the domestic market but a price
taker in a foreign market. The selling prices in both markets are denominated in local
currencies. The firm is entitled to operational hedging in that it possesses the flexibility
to make its export decision after it has observed the then prevailing spot exchange rate.3
Multinational firms, because of their worldwide distribution facilities, fit particularly well
the context of export flexibility (see Caves, 1996; Broll, 1999; Broll & Eckwert, 1999; Wong,
2003).
To examine how the firm’s production decision is affected by the interaction between
operational and financial hedging, we allow the firm to avail itself of fairly priced exotic
derivatives for hedging purposes. We show that the firm optimally tailors its customized
exotic derivative contract in a way that the hedged domestic currency profit is stabilized at
the expected level, thereby eliminating all exchange rate risk.4 When operational hedging
via export flexibility is forfeited, we show that the firm optimally cuts down its production
if the firm sells exclusively in the domestic market for sufficiently unfavorable spot exchange
rates. Otherwise, operational hedging has no effect on output. In contrast, banning the
firm from financial hedging always entices the firm into producing less. Finally, we compare
the relative efficiency of inducing the firm to produce more by means of operational hedg-
ing with that by means of financial hedging. We derive sufficient conditions under which
operational hedging dominates (is dominated by) financial hedging in terms of promoting
the firm’s optimal output. These findings suggest that the interaction between operational
and financial hedging is multi-dimensional, making the dominance of one over the other a
priori indeterminate.
This paper is closest in the spirit of Wong (2003) who also extends the model of Eldor
and Zilcha (1987) to incorporate financial hedging via trading fairly priced exotic deriva-
tives. However, the major concern of Wong’s (2003) paper is on the robustness of the
2Ware and Winter (1988), Broll and Wahl (1997), Broll (1999), Broll and Eckwert (1999), Wong (2001),
and Wong and Yick (2004) model export flexibility in a similar way for a globally competitive firm.
3Ben-Zvi and Helpman (1992) argue that international transactions are better described by such a se-
quence of moves. This is supported by the empirical evidence of Magee (1974).
4This is analogous to a well-known result in the insurance literature that a risk-averse individual fully
insures at an actuarially fair price (see Mossin, 1968).
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celebrated separation and full-hedging theorems emanated from the hedging literature (see,
e.g., Danthine, 1978; Holthausen, 1979; Feder, Just, & Schmitz, 1980). The separation the-
orem states that the production decision of a risk-averse firm is affected neither by the risk
attitude of the firm nor by the incidence of the underlying uncertainty should the firm have
access to a forward/futures market. The full-hedging theorem states that the firm should
completely eliminate its risk exposure by adopting a full-hedge if the forward/futures market
is unbiased. This paper, in contrast, focuses on how the interaction between operational and
financial hedging affects the production decisions of export-flexible firms, which is absent
in Wong (2003).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates our model of an
internationally competitive but domestically monopolistic firm under exchange rate uncer-
tainty. To hedge the exchange rate risk, the firm can trade fairly priced exotic derivatives.
Section 3 characterizes the firm’s optimal output and exotic derivative contract. Section 4
examines the effect of operational hedging via export flexibility on the firm’s production de-
cision. Section 5 goes on to examine the effect of financial hedging via trading fairly priced
exotic derivatives on the firm’s optimal output. Section 6 compares the relative efficiency
of operational hedging and financial hedging in enhancing the firm’s production. The final
section concludes.
2. The model
Consider the model of Eldor and Zilcha (1987) wherein an export-flexible firm sells in
both the domestic country and a foreign country under exchange rate uncertainty. There
is one period with three dates, indexed by t = 0, 1, and 2. At t = 0, the firm produces a
single output, q, according to a cost function, c(q), with c(0) ≥ 0, c′(q) > 0, and c′′(q) > 0.
The riskless rate of interest is known and constant for the period. To simplify notation,
we henceforth suppress the known interest factors by compounding all cash flows to their
future values at t = 2.
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We model the exchange rate uncertainty by a positive random variable, e˜, that denotes
the prevailing spot exchange rate at t = 2 and is expressed in units of the domestic currency
per unit of the foreign currency.5 Let g(e) be the probability density function of e˜ over
support [e, e], where 0 < e < e < ∞. An alternative way to model the exchange rate
uncertainty is to apply the concept of information systems that are conditional probability
density functions over a set of signals imperfectly correlated with e˜ (see Eckwert & Zilcha,
2001, 2003; Drees & Eckwert, 2003; Broll & Eckwert, 2005). The advantage of this more
general and realistic approach is that one can study the value of information by comparing
the information content of different information systems. Since the focus of this paper is
not on the value of information, we adopt a simpler structure to save notation.
The firm is export-flexible in that it makes its export (i.e., sales allocation) decision after
observing the true realization of e˜ at t = 1. Conditioned upon the observed spot exchange
rate, e, the firm sells qd units of its output in the domestic market and exports the rest,
q − qd, to the foreign country, where 0 ≤ qd ≤ q. The firm is a monopoly in the domestic
market wherein it faces an inverse demand function, pd(qd), denominated in the domestic
currency, with p′d(qd) < 0 and 2p
′
d(qd) + p
′′
d(qd)qd < 0. The firm is, however, a price taker in
the foreign market wherein it sells at a fixed price, pf , denominated in the foreign currency
and net of any tariffs and/or transportation costs.6 Due to the segmentation of the domestic
and foreign markets, arbitrage transactions are either impossible or unprofitable, thereby
hindering the law of one price.7
To hedge the exchange rate risk, the firm avails itself of customized exotic derivatives
at t = 0. We describe the payoff of an exotic derivative contract at t = 2 by a function,
φ(e), whose functional form is chosen by the firm at t = 0. To focus on the firm’s hedging
5Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
6It is noteworthy pointing out that the firm faces no exchange rate risk should pf be denominated in the
domestic currency. We assume local-currency pricing because it is commonly observed in the real world. In
the theoretical ground, Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991) show that invoicing exports in the importers’ currency
entails a precommitment to prices so that quantities to be delivered are invariant to realized spot exchange
rates. Furthermore, Friberg (1998) shows that setting prices in the importers’ currency is optimal when the
elasticity of exchange rate pass-through is less than unity, which is the dominant empirical finding in the
literature (see Menon, 1995).
7The assumption of imperfect arbitrage among national markets is supported by a number of empirical
studies of the law of one price. See, e.g., Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001) and Parsley and Wei (1996).
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motive, vis-a`-vis its speculative motive, we assume that the contract is fairly priced in
that E[φ(e˜)] = 0, where E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to g(e). That is, we
interpret φ(e) as net of the price of the contract.
The firm’s random profit at t = 2, denominated in the domestic currency, is given by
p˜i = e˜pf (q − qd) + pd(qd)qd − c(q) + φ(e˜). (1)
The firm is an expected utility maximizer and possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function, u(pi), defined over its domestic currency profit at t = 2, pi. The firm is risk averse
so that u′(pi) > 0 and u′′(pi) < 0.8
Figure 1 depicts how the sequence of events unfolds in the model.
0 1 2
The firm makes its
production and
hedging decisions.
The firm observes the true
realization of the spot
exchange rate at t = 2 and
makes its export decision.
The firm sells its
output and settles
its hedge position.
Figure 1. Time Line
3. Solution to the model
We use backward induction to solve the firm’s sequential decision problems. At t = 1,
8For privately held, owner-managed firms, risk-averse behavior prevails. Even for publicly listed firms,
managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1984), corporate taxes (Smith & Stulz, 1985), costs of financial distress
(Smith & Stulz, 1985), and capital market imperfections (Stulz, 1990; and Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein,
1993) all imply a concave objective function for firms, thereby justifying the use of risk aversion as an
approximation. See Tufano (1996) for evidence that managerial risk aversion is a rationale for corporate risk
management in the gold mining industry.
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the firm observes the true realization of the prevailing spot exchange rate at t = 2, e. Based
on this observation, the firm makes its export decision under certainty:
max
qd
u[epf(q − qd) + pd(qd)qd − c(q) + φ(e)] s.t. 0 ≤ qd ≤ q, (2)
where q and φ(e) are taken as given because they have been chosen at t = 0. The Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for program (2) are given by
pd[qd(e, q)] + p′d[qd(e, q)]qd(e, q)− epf − λ ≤ 0, (3)
q − qd(e, q) ≥ 0, (4)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier and qd(e, q) is the optimal solution. Should qd(e, q) > 0,
condition (3) holds with equality. Similarly, condition (4) holds with equality if λ > 0.9
To characterize the firm’s optimal sales allocation rule, qd(e, q), suppose first that λ > 0.
In this case, condition (4) holds with equality and thus qd(e, q) = q. It then follows from
condition (3) that pd(q) + p′d(q)q > epf or, equivalently,
e < e(q) ≡ pd(q) + p
′
d(q)q
pf
. (5)
Since 2p′d(qd) + p
′′
d(qd)qd < 0, we have e
′(q) < 0.
Now, suppose that condition (4) holds with strict inequality so that λ = 0. In this case,
condition (3) implies that
pd[qd(e, q)] + p′d[qd(e, q)]qd(e, q)− epf ≤ 0. (6)
It is evident that condition (6) must hold with strict inequality for all e > e(0) = pd(0)/pf
and thus qd(e, q) = 0. On the other hand, for all e ∈ [e(q), e(0)], there exists a unique point,
q∗d(e) ∈ [0, q], that solves condition (6) with equality:
pd[q∗d(e)] + p
′
d[q
∗
d(e)]q
∗
d(e)− epf = 0. (7)
9The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied since 2p′d(qd) + p
′′
d(qd)qd < 0.
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The firm’s optimal sales allocation rule, qd(e, q), can be summarized as follows:
qd(e, q) =

q if e ≤ e < max[e, e(q)],
q∗d(e) if max[e, e(q)] ≤ e ≤ min[e, e(0)],
0 if min[e, e(0)] < e ≤ e,
(8)
where e(q) is given by Eq. (5) and q∗d(e) is given by Eq. (7). Thus, the firm sells exclusively
in the domestic market for sufficiently unfavorable spot exchange rates only when e(q) > e.
Alternatively, it exports all of its output to the foreign country for sufficiently favorable
spot exchange rates only when e(0) < e. In the medium range, which could plausibly be
the full range when e(q) ≤ e < e ≤ e(0), of realized spot exchange rates, the firm sells in
both the domestic and foreign markets.
Prior to the resolution of the exchange rate uncertainty, the firm’s ex ante decision
problem is given by
max
q,φ(e)
E{u[pi(e˜)]} s.t. E[φ(e˜)] = 0, (9)
where pi(e˜) = e˜pf [q− qd(e˜, q)]+ pd[qd(e˜, q)]qd(e˜, q)− c(q)+φ(e˜) and qd(e˜, q) is defined in Eq.
(8). The first-order conditions for program (9) are given by
E
{
u′[pi∗(e˜)]{max[e˜, e(q∗)]pf − c′(q∗)}
}
= 0, (10)
u′[pi∗(e)]− µ∗ = 0 for all e ∈ [e, e], (11)
where Eq. (10) follows from Leibniz’s rule, µ is the Lagrange multiplier, and an asterisk (∗)
indicates an optimal level.10
Since Eq. (11) implies that pi∗(e) is constant for all e ∈ [e, e], it then follows from
E[φ∗(e˜)] = 0 that
φ∗(e) = ν∗ − epf [q∗ − qd(e, q∗)]− pd[qd(e, q∗)]qd(e, q∗) for all e ∈ [e, e], (12)
10The second-order conditions for program (9) are satisfied given risk aversion and the strict convexity of
c(q).
operational and financial hedging for exporting firms 8
where ν∗ = E{e˜pf [q∗ − qd(e˜, q∗)] + pd[qd(e˜, q∗)]qd(e˜, q∗)}. In words, the firm tailors the
optimal exotic derivative contract, φ∗(e), in a way that its hedged domestic currency profit
at t = 2 is stabilized at the expected level, thereby eliminating all exchange rate risk.
Dividing both sides of Eq. (10) by u′[pi∗(e)], which is invariant to different realizations
of e˜, yields
c′(q∗) = E{max[e˜, e(q∗)]}pf . (13)
Since the exchange rate risk is completely eliminated by the optimal exotic derivative
contract, the firm chooses its optimal output so as to maximize E{e˜pf [q − qd(e˜, q)] +
pd[qd(e˜, q)]qd(e˜, q)} − c(q), thereby yielding Eq. (13).
4. The effect of operational hedging on production
To examine the effect of operational hedging on the firm’s optimal production decision,
we consider the hypothetical case wherein the firm is obliged to commit to an fixed amount
of export irrespective of the true realization of the prevailing spot exchange rate at t = 2.
The firm’s random domestic currency profit at t = 2 as such is given by
p¯i(e˜) = e˜pf (q − qd) + pd(qd)qd − c(q) + φ(e˜). (14)
At t = 0, the firm chooses its level of output, q, its level of domestic sales, qd, and a fairly
priced exotic derivative contract, φ(e), so as to maximize the expected utility of its random
domestic currency profit at t = 2:
max
q,qd,φ(e)
E{u[p¯i(e˜)]} s.t. 0 ≤ qd ≤ q and E[φ(e˜)] = 0, (15)
where pi(e) is defined in Eq. (14).
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for program (15) are given by
E{u′[p¯i0(e˜)][e˜pf − c′(q0)]} = 0, (16)
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E{u′[p¯i0(e˜)][pd(q0d) + p′d(q0d)q0d − e˜pf ]} − λ0 ≤ 0, (17)
q0 − q0d ≥ 0, (18)
u′[p¯i0(e)]− µ0 = 0 for all e ∈ [e, e], (19)
where λ and µ are the Lagrange multipliers and a nought (0) indicates an optimal level.
Should q0d > 0, condition (17) holds with equality. Similarly, condition (18) holds with
equality if λ0 > 0.11
Since Eq. (19) implies that p¯i0(e) is constant for all e ∈ [e, e], it then follows from
E[φ0(e˜)] = 0 that
φ0(e) = [E(e˜)− e]pf (q0 − q0d) for all e ∈ [e, e]. (20)
In words, the firm completely eliminates its exchange rate risk exposure by the optimal ex-
otic derivative contract, φ0(e), which can be perfectly replicated by a full-hedge via shorting
pf (q0 − q0d) units of the unbiased futures contracts.
Dividing both sides of Eq. (16) by u′[p¯i0(e)], which is invariant to different realizations
of e˜, yields
c′(q0) = E(e˜)pf . (21)
Similarly, we can rewrite condition (17) as
pd(q0d) + p
′
d(q
0
d)q
0
d − E(e˜)pf −
λ0
u′[p¯i0(e)]
≤ 0. (22)
Thus, it follows from condition (22) and the analysis in Section 3 that q0d = qd[E(e˜), q
0],
where qd(e, q) is defined in Eq. (8).12
11The second-order conditions for program (15) are satisfied given risk aversion and the assumed properties
of c(q) and pd(qd).
12Eqs. (20) and (21) are simply the celebrated separation and full-hedging theorems of Danthine (1978),
Holthausen (1979), and Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980).
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Proposition 1. Suppose that the export-inflexible firm is allowed to use fairly priced exotic
derivatives for hedging purposes. Introducing operational hedging via export flexibility to the
firm has a positive (no) effect on output, i.e., q∗ > (=) q0, if e(q0) > (≤) e.
Proof. If e(q0) ≤ e, Eq. (13) becomes Eq. (21) at q0 and thus q∗ = q0. On the other
hand, if e(q0) > e, the right-hand side of Eq. (13) exceeds E(e˜) at q0 and thus q∗ 6= q0.
Since c′′(q) > 0 and e′(q) < 0, it follows immediately from Eqs. (13) and (21) that q∗ > q0.
2
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. Using Eq. (14), we can write Eq. (1) with
qd = qd(e, q) as
pi(e) = p¯i(e)− [pd(qd)− epf ]qd + {pd[qd(e, q)]− epf}qd(e, q). (23)
It is evident that the firm’s output, q, affects its random domestic currency profit at t = 2
differently with and without operational hedging through the last term on the right-hand
side of Eq. (23). Suppose that the firm ignores the marginal effect of its output on this
term. Then, Eq. (23) implies that q∗ = q0. If e(q0) ≤ e, from Eq. (8) we have
qd(e, q0) =

q∗d(e) if e ≤ e ≤ min[e, e(0)],
0 if min[e, e(0)] < e ≤ e,
(24)
which is independent of q0. Thus, it follows from Eq. (24) that the marginal effect of the
firm’s output on {pd[qd(e, q)]− epf}qd(e, q) can indeed be ignored at q = q0 for all e ∈ [e, e].
In words, if it is not optimal to sell exclusively in the domestic market even under the worst
possible spot exchange rate, introducing operational hedging via export flexibility to the
firm does not affect the optimal output.
If e(q0) > e, from Eq. (8) we have
qd(e, q0) =

q0 if e ≤ e < e(q0),
q∗d(e) if e(q
0) ≤ e ≤ min[e, e(0)],
0 if min[e, e(0)] < e ≤ e.
(25)
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Eq. (25) implies that the marginal effect of the firm’s output on {pd[qd(e, q)]− epf}qd(e, q)
cannot be ignored at q = q0 for all e ∈ [e, e(q0)), which is equal to [e(q0)− e]pf > 0. Thus,
the firm is induced to produce beyond q0. In words, if it is optimal to sell exclusively in the
domestic market for sufficiently unfavorable spot exchange rates, introducing operational
hedging via export flexibility to the firm renders a positive effect on output.
5. The effect of financial hedging on production
Now, we want to examine the effect of financial hedging on the firm’s optimal production
decision. To this end, we consider the hypothetical case wherein the firm is banned from
engaging in risk management. That is, we set φ(e) ≡ 0 and thus the firm’s random domestic
currency profit at t = 2 is given by
pˆi(e˜) = e˜pf [q − qd(e˜, q)] + pd[qd(e˜, q)]qd(e˜, q)− c(q), (26)
where qd(e, q) is defined in Eq. (8).
The firm chooses its level of output, q, at t = 0 so as to maximize the expected utility
of its random domestic currency profit at t = 2:
max
q
E{u[pˆi(e˜)]}, (27)
where pi(e˜) is defined in Eq. (26). The first-order condition for program (27) is given by
E
{
u′[pˆi(e˜)]{max[e˜, e(q)]pf − c′(q)}
}
= 0, (28)
where Eq. (28) follows from Leibniz’s rule and a diamond () indicates an optimal level.13
13The second-order condition for program (27) is satisfied given risk aversion and the strict convexity of
c(q).
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Proposition 2. If the export-flexible firm is banned from engaging in risk management, its
optimal level of output depends on its risk preferences as well as on the underlying exchange
rate uncertainty. Furthermore, introducing fairly priced exotic derivatives to the firm for
hedging purposes always entails a positive effect on output, i.e., q∗ > q.
Proof. The first part of this proposition is evident from equation (28). To prove the second
part, we differentiate E{u[pˆi(e˜)]} with respect to q and evaluate the resulting derivative at
q = q∗ to yield14
d
dq
E{u[pˆi(e˜)]}
∣∣∣∣
q=q∗
= Cov{u′[pˆi∗(e˜)],max[e˜, e(q∗)]}pf , (29)
where pˆi∗(e˜) = e˜pf [q∗ − qd(e˜, q∗)] + pd[qd(e˜, q∗)]qd(e˜, q∗) − c(q∗), Cov(·, ·) is the covariance
operator with respect to g(e), and we have used Eq. (13). Note that
∂
∂e
u′[pˆi∗(e)] = u′′[pˆi∗(e)]pf [q∗ − qd(e, q∗)] ≤ 0, (30)
since u′′(pi) < 0 and qd(e, q∗) ≤ q∗, and the inequality is strict for all e ∈ [max[e, e(q∗)], e].
Let eˆ = E{max[e˜, e(q∗)]} > e(q∗). Then, we have
Cov{u′[pˆi∗(e˜)],max[e˜, e(q∗)]} =
∫ e
e
u′[pˆi∗(e)]{max[e, e(q∗)]− eˆ}g(e)de
=
∫ e
e
{u′[pˆi∗(e)]−u′[pˆi∗(eˆ)]}{max[e, e(q∗)]− eˆ}g(e)de.(31)
From Eq. (30), we have u′[pˆi∗(e)] ≤ (≥) u′[pˆi∗(eˆ)] if e > (<) eˆ. Thus, Eq. (31) implies that
Cov{u′[pˆi∗(e˜)],max[e˜, e(q∗)]} < 0. It then follows from Eqs. (28) and (29) and the strict
concavity of E{u[pˆi(e˜)]} in q that q < q∗. 2
To see the intuition of Proposition 2, we write Eq. (26) as
pˆi(e) = E{e˜pf [q − qd(e˜, q)] + pd[qd(e˜, q)]qd(e˜, q)} − c(q)
14For any two random variables, x˜ and y˜, we have Cov(x˜, y˜) = E(x˜y˜)− E(x˜)E(y˜).
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+
{
epf [q − qd(e, q)] + pd[qd(e, q)]qd(e, q)
−E{e˜pf [q − qd(e˜, q)] + pd[qd(e˜, q)]qd(e˜, q)}
}
. (32)
The expression inside the curly brackets on the right-hand side of Eq. (32) is random and
has mean zero. Since the firm is banned from engaging in risk management, this random
noise term can only be controlled by varying q. Given risk aversion, it is thus optimal for
the firm to produce less than q∗, a result in line with that of Sandmo (1971).
6. Operational hedging versus financial hedging
From Propositions 1 and 2, it is evident that operational hedging via export flexibility
and financial hedging via trading fairly priced exotic derivatives are complements in terms
of promoting the firm’s optimal output. However, making both hedging devices available
for the firm may sometimes be too costly. It is thus of interest to compare the relative
efficiency of inducing the firm to produce by means of operational hedging with that by
means of financial hedging. Note that q (q0) is the firm’s optimal output when it possesses
operational (financial) hedging but no financial (operational) hedging. We say that oper-
ational hedging dominates (is dominated by) financial hedging in terms of promoting the
firm’s optimal output if, and only if, q > (<) q0.
To compare q and q0, we differentiate E{u[pˆi(e˜)]} with respect to q and evaluate the
resulting derivative at q = q0 to yield
d
dq
E{u[pˆi(e˜)]}
∣∣∣∣
q=q0
= E
{
u′[pˆi0(e˜)]{max[e˜, e(q0)]− E(e˜)}pf
}
, (33)
where pˆi0(e˜) = e˜pf [q0 − qd(e˜, q0)] + pd[qd(e˜, q0)]qd(e˜, q0)− c(q0) and we have used Eq. (21).
If the right-hand side of Eq. (33) is positive (negative), it follows from Eq. (28) and the
strict concavity of E{u[pˆi(e˜)]} in q that q > (<) q0.
The right-hand side of Eq. (33) is a priori indeterminate and can either be positive or
be negative. We state and prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 3. Operational hedging via export flexibility dominates or is dominated by
financial hedging via trading customized exotic derivatives in terms of promoting the export-
ing firm’s optimal output, i.e., q > q0 or q < q0, depending on whether e(q0) ≥ E(e˜) or
e(q0) ≤ e, respectively.
Proof. If e(q0) ≥ E(e˜), the right-hand side of Eq. (33) is clearly positive since max[e˜, e(q0)] ≥
E(e˜). Thus, we have q > q0.
If e(q0) ≤ e, we write Eq. (33) as
d
dq
E{u[pˆi(e˜)]}
∣∣∣∣
q=q0
= E{u′[pˆi0(e˜)][e˜− E(e˜)]}pf = Cov{u′[pˆi0(e˜)], e˜}pf . (34)
Since ∂u′[pˆi0(e)]/∂e = u′′[pˆi0(e)]pf [q0 − qd(e, q0)] ≤ 0, we have Cov{u′[pˆi0(e˜)], e˜} < 0. Thus,
it follows from Eq. (34) that q < q0. 2
The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. If e(q0) ≥ E(e˜), we have q0d = qd[E(e˜), q0] =
q0. That means, the firm possessing financial hedging but no operational hedging does
not export any of its output so that financial hedging becomes redundant. Operational
hedging, on the other hand, is never redundant, thereby rendering its dominance in this
case. If e(q0) ≤ e, Proposition 1 tells us that the firm possessing financial hedging but no
operational hedging has already produced at the first-best level, i.e., q0 = q∗. Replacing
financial hedging by operational hedging simply resumes the exchange rate risk and thus
gives the firm perverse incentives to produce.
In the normal case where e < e(q0) < E(e˜), the dominance is less clear cut. To see this,
we write Eq. (33) as
d
dq
E{u[pˆi(e˜)]}
∣∣∣∣
q=q0
= E{u′[pˆi0(e˜)]}
{
E{max[e˜, e(q0)]} − E(e˜)
}
pf
+Cov{u′[pˆi0(e˜)],max[e˜, e(q0)]}pf . (35)
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (35) is positive because E{max[e˜, e(q0)]} ≥ E(e˜),
where the equality holds only when e(q0) ≤ e. This reflects the fact that the expected
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marginal revenue is higher with operational hedging than with financial hedging. However,
the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (35) is unambiguously negative. This is due
to the fact that financial hedging eliminates all exchange rate risk but operational hedging
removes none. Thus, the interaction between operational and financial hedging is multi-
dimensional, making the relative efficiency of inducing the firm to produce by means of
operational hedging to that by means of financial hedging a priori indeterminate.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the interaction between operational hedging via export
flexibility and financial hedging via trading fairly priced exotic derivatives in the context of
an internationally competitive but domestically monopolistic firm under exchange rate un-
certainty. The firm is export flexible in that it makes its export decision after observing the
true realization of the then prevailing spot exchange rate. We have shown that operational
hedging entices the firm into producing more if selling exclusively in the domestic market
is optimal for sufficiently unfavorable spot exchange rates. Otherwise, operational hedging
has no effect on output. In contrast, the effect of financial hedging on output is always
positive. Finally, we have examined the relative efficiency of inducing the firm to produce
more by means of operational hedging to that by means of financial hedging. We have
derived sufficient conditions under which operational hedging dominates (is dominated by)
financial hedging in terms of promoting the firm’s optimal output. These findings suggest
that the interaction between operational and financial hedging is multi-dimensional, making
the dominance of one over the other a priori indeterminate.
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